Clause 16
Schedule 1. Amended personal information protection principles.
Ms BURNET - Thank you, Chair. I have two lots of amendments. They have been circulated, but if anybody else would like a copy, I do have those.
During my second reading speech, I asked the Attorney‑General to explain to this House why clause 16(b) is needed at all, and what work it does that is not already done by 16(a) or the existing Schedule 2 (d) to (g) of the Personal Information Protection Act. I might say this relates to the Personal Information Protection Act 2004, so to enable the release of personal information in circumstances where there is a risk to child safety.
The Attorney‑General gave us a cook's tour of the Personal Information Protection Act, but he didn't actually answer that question. Since the debate commenced on this bill, the independent monitor, as the Attorney‑General has said, has written to MPs about this bill and claimed that support for this clause can be found in the Commission of Inquiry and Woolcott reports. So, I'll address that claim now before moving my amendment. I refer to excerpts from the Commission of Inquiry, Volume 8, Chapter 19, Part 5 - 'Improving information sharing and cross-agency coordination for child safety'. At page 131 it says:
In our view, the Personal Information Protection Act already contains sufficient exemptions which would, if interpreted in a way that seeks to promote the safety and wellbeing of children and young people, enable information about the safety of children to be shared. [TBC]
Then at page 132, secretary Webster was quoted as saying:
These reforms impinge on the existing privacy rights of individuals. Legislative reforms to information sharing and erosion of privacy protections can be fraught and controversial. I fully support the need to significantly increase the rights of children to be safe and understand the processes that have affected them, but I note that these reforms will need to be carefully considered and balanced. I also note that the reforms will be complex drafting exercises because of the numerous Tasmanian statutes that contain confidentiality provisions for various policy reasons. [TBC]
Then at page 132 it says:
We recommend confidentiality and secrecy provisions in Tasmanian legislation be reviewed. Where these provisions create specific legislative barriers to the sharing of information to protect the safety and wellbeing of children and young people, these barriers should be removed. We consider, however, that many failures to share information stem from a culture within parts of the State Service, including those providing advice. These cultural barriers must be addressed. [TBC]
Now, I go to the Woolcott report. On page 110 it states that:
In an attempt to understand the legislative barriers to information sharing, the Department of Justice advised us in August/September 2025, that the Department was not aware of any specific information sharing barriers that cannot be overcome within the current statutory frameworks. [TBC]
Strategic recommendations 5.2, 5.3 and related concerns in 6.3 all expressly reference the sharing of information in relation to child sexual abuse matters, and yet the government has given us this amendment to enable additional sharing of personal information between agencies with no reference to child safety.
I now move an amendment -
Clause 16, page 14, paragraph (b).
leave out that paragraph.
I'll go on. I agree that clause 16(a) is absolutely necessary and will achieve the stated aim of the government's purpose to improve child safety reporting and investigations by agencies of child safety matters. I agree that this is a valid and justifiable reason to weaken the protections that apply to personal information.
Clause 16(b), on the other hand, contains no reference to child safety. It goes far beyond the child safety specific reform that Clause 16(a) achieves. Presently, the Personal Information Protection Act allows sharing of personal information by the government agencies for certain limited, specified purposes with a law enforcement agency. The rationale is quite obvious.; law enforcement agencies have a role to investigate crime, but my concern is that clause 16(b) dramatically expands the definition of law enforcement agency to include effectively any government agency. So, essentially, if the government's amendment is successful, any government agency will be able to share any protected personal information with any other government agency, so long as it is for one of the specified purposes already in the act in Schedule 1 clause 2(g), which include protection of public revenue and court and tribunal proceedings.
This clause does not limit the purpose of use of that information to enhance child safety. In fact, there is no mention of child safety at all in the amending clause of the original clause. According to the clause notes, clause 16(b) 'provides a pathway to enable information sharing across all government agencies regarding child sexual abuse concerns and reportable conduct'.
But that is what 16(a) already achieves, so 16(b) allows all government agencies to request personal information with no requirement that it relate to child safety concerns at all. So, the clause notes are actually misrepresenting the clause.
I'll give you an example of how this change might be used. The State Revenue Office might want to investigate a person who it believes owes them money. Nothing criminal, just a debt. Now, under this expanded power, they can go and request protected personal information from another agency in order to build a case against that person. It's the same with the Monetary Penalties Enforcement Service. Or how about a government agency that is involved in an unlawful dismissal case? They can now request protected personal information about that person from any of the government agencies - a dirt file. It will allow any agency to share personal information about a State servant, or any Tasmanian, wherever it reasonably believes this is necessary for the prevention, detection or investigation of any breach of any law, debt protection of public revenue, or any court proceedings. That is an extremely broad power, and its breadth should concern every member of this House.
Chair, no doubt there are government departments that have long wanted greater access to our personal information to advance their case in the pursuit of employee management or collecting of revenue or other interests of the state, through general litigation. If they want that general power, they should come to parliament and justify it openly - not have it inserted into a bill about child safety. And it weakens it. It should be just about child safety.
The government has failed to identify what situational risk to child safety section 16(a) doesn't cover and why 16(b) is necessary. My amendment seeks to remove that clause 16(b), and removing it doesn't undermine or wind back what clause 16(a) rightly achieves.
I commend it to the House.
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Ms BURNET - I thank everybody for those contributions to this amendment I've put. I just wanted to go to the comments of the Attorney-General in the first instance. I'll read from a letter I sent to MPs on 26 October, yesterday, in relation to this and in relation to Mr Benjamin's concerns:
The government has not adequately explained what additional child safety benefit clause 16(b) delivers beyond clause 16(a), existing Personal Information Protection Act exceptions and the information-sharing framework under the Child and Youth Safety Organisations Act 2023 (CYSOA). Mr Benjamin raised a concern about a situation where a person might slip through the cracks if they were not considered a worker and did not hold a Working with Vulnerable People card. Now, the CYSOA's definition of worker is very broad, including contractors, subcontractors, consultants and volunteers, and its reportable conduct scheme applies across a broad range of organisations, including government agencies. If gaps remain, the government should identify them and explain why general expansion of information-sharing powers is necessary.
I don't think the Attorney-General has put forward a case to support that position.
I go to some of Ms Rosol's comments referring to James Griffin and the horrific situation where James Griffin couldn't be tracked with information being shared. I understand the sentiment of what Ms Rosol has said but, again, 16(b) is a significantly broad definition which covers the Personal Information Protection Act of many, many Tasmanians, so it's thousands of Tasmanians. I don't think this explanation that's been provided does stand in the way of this amendment